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Safety is a critical concern for the next generation of autonomy that is likely to rely heavily on deep neural
networks for perception and control. Formally verifying the safety and robustness of well-trained DNNs
and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (Le-CPS) under adversarial attacks, model uncertainties, and
sensing errors is essential for safe autonomy. This research proposes a framework to repair unsafe DNNs
in safety-critical systems with reachability analysis. The repair process is inspired by adversarial training
which has demonstrated high effectiveness in improving the safety and robustness of DNNs. Different from
traditional adversarial training approaches where adversarial examples are utilized from random attacks and
may not be representative of all unsafe behaviors, our repair process uses reachability analysis to compute the
exact unsafe regions and identify sufficiently representative examples to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of
the adversarial training.
The performance of our repair framework is evaluated on two types of benchmarks without safe models as
references. One is a DNN controller for aircraft collision avoidance with access to training data. The other is a
rocket lander where our framework can be seamlessly integrated with the well-known deep deterministic
policy gradient (DDPG) reinforcement learning algorithm. The experimental results show that our framework
can successfully repair all instances on multiple safety specifications with negligible performance degradation.
In addition, to increase the computational and memory efficiency of the reachability analysis algorithm in
the framework, we propose a depth-first-search algorithm that combines an existing exact analysis method
with an over-approximation approach based on a new set representation. Experimental results show that our
method achieves a five-fold improvement in runtime and a two-fold improvement in memory usage compared
to exact analysis.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Neural network repair, reachability analysis, safe reinforcement learning

1

INTRODUCTION

Despite success of deep neural networks (DNNs) in various applications, trustworthiness is still
one of the main issues preventing widespread use. Research has shown that DNNs may generate
undesired behaviors even with the slightest perturbations on input data. Recently, many techniques
for analyzing behaviors of DNNs have been presented [Anderson et al. 2020; Botoeva et al. 2020;
Dutta et al. 2018; Frankle et al. 2020; Katz et al. 2019; Singh et al. 2019; Sotoudeh and Thakur 2021b;
Tran et al. 2019c, 2020b; Urban et al. 2020; Urban and Miné 2021; Wang et al. 2020; Xiong and
Jagannathan 2021; Yang et al. 2021a, 2020, 2021b]. Given a DNN, these works can generate a safety
certificate over an input-output specification [Seshia et al. 2018]. However, due to the black-box
nature of DNNs, training safe DNNs or repairing their erroneous behaviors remains a challenge.
Existing works to improve the safety and robustness of DNNs can be classified into two main
categories. The first category relies on singular adversarial inputs to make specialized modifications
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on neural weights that likely result in misbehavior. In [Sohn et al. 2019a], the authors propose
a technique named Arachne. There, given a set of finite adversarial inputs that cause undesired
behaviors, with guidance of a fitness function, Arachne searches and subsequently modifies neural
weights that are likely related to these undesired behaviors. The method supports specifications
consisting of a finite set of inputs instead of continuous regions. In [Goldberger et al. 2020], the
authors propose a DNN verification-based method that modifies undesirable behavior of DNNs
by manipulating neural weights of the output layer. The correctness of the repaired DNN can be
formally proved with the verification technique. However, the repair process is limited to a single
adversarial example in each iteration. Typically, DNNs may contain multiple unsafe input regions
over a continuous domain. In addition, the approach relies on modifications of the output layer,
which may limit its capability. The second category utilizes adversarial examples for retraining.
Adversarial training works such as [Goodfellow et al. 2014; Madry et al. 2017] have demonstrated
that incorporating adversarial examples into the training process can improve the robustness of
DNNs. However, DNNs may misbehave over continuous regions and infinitely many adversarial
examples. Despite the robustness improvements, this training approach cannot guarantee safety
for the learned DNNs. To solve this issue, some researchers incorporate reachability analysis in this
process, such that they can train a model that is provably safe against norm-bounded adversarial
attacks [Mirman et al. 2018; Wong and Kolter 2018]. Given a norm-bounded input range, these
approaches over approximate the output reachable domain of DNNs with convex regions. Then
they conduct robust optimization by minimizing the worst-case loss over these regions, which aims
to migrate all the outputs to a desired domain. The primary issue of these approaches is that the
approximation error accumulates during computation. For large input domains or complex DNNs,
their approximated reachable domain can be so conservative that a low-fidelity worst-case loss may
result in significant accuracy degradation. One promising alternative is to utilize exact reachability
analysis methods [Bak et al. 2020; Tran et al. 2020a, 2019c, 2020b; Yang et al. 2021a]. These methods
can compute the exact reachable set of DNNs and identify all the unsafe input regions.
In this paper, we propose a framework to repair DNNs, which combines adversarial training with
exact reachability analysis of DNNs. We demonstrate the method and repair DNN controllers with
respect to input-output safety specifications. In each iteration of the process, unsafe input regions are
computed and incorporated into the training data. The iterative process will terminate once a model
candidate is verified safe and also its performance is above a threshold. At the heart of our approach,
we utilize a novel exact reachability method that is optimized for identification of the unsafe input
regions. We also integrate our framework with learning algorithms of DNNs, specifically the deep
reinforcement learning (DRL). The feasibility and effectiveness of this DNN repair framework
is demonstrated on two types of benchmarks. One is an unsafe DNN of a horizontal collision
avoidance system where the training data is accessible. For unsafe DNNs where the training data is
available, the repair algorithm merges the unsafe regions of the model candidate to the training
data in each loop, as shown in Figure 3. The other benchmark is an application of our framework
on a DNN trained through a DRL algorithm. Here, the repair algorithm will be slightly modified
since DRL is utilized to learn policies that maximize the expectation of rewards in the long term,
as well as ensure reasonable behaviors by avoiding violations of safety constraints. The risk in
DRL is normally associated with the inherent uncertainty of the environment and the facet that
even an optimal agent may perform unsuccessfully with such stochastic natures. It is because the
maximization of long-term rewards only involve finite environment and agent states, and it does
not necessarily prevent rare occurrence of states that incur unsafe unsafe actions and subsequent
safety violations. There is significant recent work on safe RL [Alshiekh et al. 2018; Bouton et al.
2019; Cheng et al. 2019; Fulton and Platzer 2018; Huang et al. 2020; Islam et al. 2020; Sohn et al.
2019b; Xiong et al. 2020; Zhou et al. 2020]. Most existing work relies on high-fidelity knowledge
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of the environment dynamics and, to our best knowledge, there exist few approaches that can
compute and eliminate risks from the environment uncertainty due to their non-determinism.
In contrast, the advantages of our framework for DRL are threefold. Firstly, our framework can
construct the all possible states as well as the uncertainties with regions. Secondly, our framework
considers all unsafe state spaces in the regions and efficiently explore these spaces to reduce risks
where the elimination of risks can be formally verified. Thirdly, our framework is well compatible
with its learning process, with few adjustments needed for repair.
We summarize our contributions as follows: (1) We propose a framework for repair of DNNs with
respect to input-output safety specifications. Our method does not require safe model references
and can successfully repair unsafe DNNs on multiple safety specifications with negligible impact
on performance. (2) The method can be utilized with deep reinforcement learning to generate
provably safe agents. (3) We present a novel depth-first-search reachability analysis algorithm that
includes both exact and over-approximation methods. This results in a five-fold computational
speedup and two-fold memory reduction when compared to other state-of-the-art approaches. (4)
The framework is evaluated on two benchmark problems where the detailed evolution of model
candidates under repair is thoroughly analyzed.
2
2.1

PRELIMINARIES
Reachability Analysis and Set Representation

Reachability analysis is a process of computing reachable sets for the states of a system w.r.t.
an initial state domain. For DNNs, given an input set bounding all possible inputs, reachability
analysis computes its output reachable domain. In other words, it computes the domain of all
possible outputs that the DNN can produce given an input range. The set normally refers to a
convex polytope or a convex region bounded with linear constraints. In this process, sets will be
sequentially updated by the affine mapping and activation functions in neurons in the DNNs until
the last layer where the final sets compose the reachable domain of the DNN. The choice of set
representation is a critical component of reachability analysis algorithms, and it has implications in
computational complexity and accuracy of the approach. There are many mathematical structures
that enable the definition of a convex polytope. For example, the half-space representation defines
a polytope as a set of finite linear constraints. The vertex representation defines a polytope with
a finite number of extreme points. The reachability analysis method in this work mainly relies
on two set representations. One is the FVIM [Yang et al. 2021a] for exact reachability analysis,
and the other one, a novel over-approximation approach proposed in this work, is the V-zono
representation proposed in Section 5. The new representation improves the computation speed
and memory footprint of the algorithm. In the following, we review the FVIM representation for
exact reachability analysis of DNNs [Yang et al. 2021a].
2.2

Facet-vertex Incidence Matrix

A facet-vertex incidence matrix (FVIM) is a complete encoding of the combinatorial structure of a
convex set or a polytope [Henk et al. 2004]. It describes the containment relation between facets
of a polytope and its vertices, where facets and vertices are types of faces and they are defined in
Definition 2.1. The FVIM approach for exact reachability analysis of ReLU DNNs has been shown
to be very efficient compared to approaches with different set representations [Yang et al. 2021a].
One example of the FVIM representation of a 3-dimensional polytope 𝑆 is shown in Figure 6. The
polytope contains eight vertices denoted as vs and six facets denoted as 𝐹 s. Each facet is a face of 𝑆
which contains four vertices. For instance, the facet 𝐹 1 denotes the plane containing vertices v1 ,
v2 , v3 and v4 . The complete containment relation between vertices vs and facets 𝐹 s is encoded in
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the FVIM on the left matrix. Together with real values of vertices, FVIM can represent the set 𝑆.
Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Faces). Given a polytope 𝑆 and a supporting hyperplane H : 𝑎 ⊤𝑥 + 𝑏 = 0 whose
halfpsace 𝑎 ⊤𝑥 + 𝑏 ≤ 0 or 𝑎 ⊤𝑥 + 𝑏 ≥ 0 contains 𝑆, if the dimension of 𝐹 =H ∩ 𝑆 is 𝑘, then 𝐹 is a
𝑘-dimensional face of 𝑆 and denoted as 𝑘-face. A full-dimensional convex polytope 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑅𝑑 contain
0-faces,1-faces, . . . , (𝑑-1)-faces which are respectively named vertex, edges, . . . , facets. The cardinality
of 𝑘-faces is denoted as 𝑓𝑘 (𝑆).
Definition 2.2 (Facet-vertex incidence matrix). The facet-vertex incidence matrix of a fulldimensional polytope 𝑆 ∈ R𝑑 is a matrix F ∈ {0, 1} 𝑓𝑛-1 (𝑆)×𝑓0 (𝑆) where the entry F (𝐹, v)=1 indicates
that the facet 𝐹 contains the vertex v, while the entry F (𝐹, v)=0, otherwise.
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Fig. 1. Example of the facet-vertex incidence matrix.

Reachability analysis of DNNs with FVIM consists of the sequential application of two main
processes. One is affine mapping of the input set by the weights and bias for each layer. This is
followed by the transformation operation on the input set through each neuron in the layer. For
affine mapping, one useful attribute of FVIM is that it actually only changes the value of vertices
and will preserve the FVIM, which can ensure an efficient computation. As the input set passes
through neurons, our algorithm checks whether the input range spans over the two linearities of
the ReLU function. This is done by computing the lower bound and upper bound of the range. If
it spans both linearities, then subsets belonging to different linearities are processed separately.
The computation of the lower bound and upper bound of a set is one of primary challenges in
the reachability analysis of DNNs. In other works, this problem is commonly encoded with LP
solvers [Bak et al. 2020; Tran et al. 2019c; Wong and Kolter 2018; Zhang et al. 2018], which normally
deal with a large number of variables and may exhibit undesired efficiency. In contrast, FVIM
encodes all the vertices of the set which can be directly used to determine the lower bound and
upper bound of the set. Thus the LP problems can be avoided.
3

DEEP NEURAL NETWORK REPAIR

It has been shown that training of DNNs with adversarial examples is an effective way to improve
its robustness with respect to safety [Athalye et al. 2018; Goodfellow et al. 2014; Madry et al. 2017;
Tramer et al. 2020]. These methods utilize a relatively small number of adversarial examples to train
more robust DNNs. However, for DNN applications in safety-critical systems, additional guarantees
are necessary. It is important to go from robustness improvements to safety guarantees without
sacrificing performance of the DNN.
3.1

Provably Safe DNNs

Let N : 𝑋 → 𝑌 where 𝑋 and 𝑌 are the input and output space be a Deep Neural Network such
that given an input x ∈ 𝑋 , produces an output y = N (𝑥) ∈ 𝑌 . The safety verification problem of
DNNs w.r.t. safety properties is formally defined as follows.
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Definition 3.1 (Safety Property). A safety property P of a DNN N specifies an input domain
I ⊆ 𝑋 and a corresponding unsafe output domain U ⊆ 𝑌 .
Definition 3.2 (DNN Safety Verification). A DNN is safe on a property P, or N |= P, if for
any x ∈ I and y = N (x) then y ∉ U. Otherwise, it is unsafe, or N ̸ |= P.
Given a set of safety properties {P}𝑛𝑖=1 , a performance function A, and a candidate DNN N , we
define the DNN Repair problem as the problem of retraining or repairing the DNN to generate
a new DNN N ′ such that all the properties are satisfied and the accuracy or performance of the
candidate DNN is maintained. For classification DNNs, the performance function A refers to the
classification accuracy on test data. For DNN agents in DRL, A refers to the averaged rewards on
certain number of episode tests.
Problem 3.1 (DNN Repair). Given a DNN candidate N , safety properties {P}𝑛𝑖=1 and performance
function A, train a DNN N ′ such that N ′ |= {P}𝑛𝑖=1 and also 𝐴(N ′) − 𝐴(N ) ≥ 𝜀. 𝜀 is a constant
value used to set the performance threshold.
3.2

Reachability Analysis of DNNs with Backtracking

At the core of our approach, a reachability analysis method is utilized to determine specification
violations. While traditional reachability analysis of neural networks focuses on computing output
reachable domain given an input domain, for neural network repair, it is just as important to
backtrack the unsafe reachable domain to the corresponding unsafe input domain containing
all adversarial examples. The input domain that generates unsafe behaviors is then used for the
training/repair process of the DNN. The computation of the unsafe input domain is normally
associated with the computation of its output reachable domain. The algorithm needs first to
determine the overlap between the reachable domain and the predefined unsafe domain before
backtracking the corresponding unsafe input space. The computation of output reachable domain
as well as the subsequent computation of unsafe input spaces are defined in Definition 3.3 and 3.4.
They are also illustrated in Figure 2. Given an input set I𝑖𝑛 , a square input domain in blue, the exact
output reachable domain O can be computed by O = N(I𝑖𝑛 ). When O overlaps with the unsafe
domain U which is O𝑢 = O ∩ U and O𝑢 ≠ ∅, we can compute the unsafe input space I𝑢 in red
area that only contains all the inputs leading to the safety violation.
Definition 3.3 (Output Reachable Domain). Let the computation of reachable sets of a DNN
N be denoted as N(·). Given an input set I𝑖𝑛 to N , a set of output reachable sets {𝑆 }𝑛𝑘=1 of N can be
Ð
computed as {𝑆 }𝑛𝑘=1 = N(I𝑖𝑛 ). We define the output reachable domain as O = 𝑛𝑘=1 𝑆𝑘 .
Definition 3.4 (Unsafe Input Domain). Given an input set I𝑖𝑛 to a DNN N and its output
reachable domain O that contains reachable sets {𝑆 }𝑛𝑘=1 , if O overlaps with the unsafe domain U,
then it is denoted as O𝑢 = O ∩ U and O𝑢 is named unsafe output reachable domain. The computation
of the unsafe input domain refers to the process of computing a set of input subsets {𝐼 }𝑚
𝑖=1 ⊂ I and
Ð
I𝑢 = 𝑚
𝐼
,
such
that
∀x
∈
I
,
its
output
y
∈
O
and
also
that
∀x
∉
I
,
its
output
y
∉ O𝑢 . This
𝑢
𝑢
𝑢
𝑖=1 𝑖
process is denoted as I𝑢 = B(O).
Next, the algorithm for the computation of reachable sets will be presented in detail. We assume
that DNNs consists of one input layer, multiple hidden layers with ReLU neurons, and one output
layer with identity neurons. Except for the input layer, the computation in each layer includes
affine mapping by the weights and bias ahead and also the process with neurons. affine mapping is
denoted as T(·). The computation function for each neuron is denoted as E(·). Given an incoming
set 𝑆 ∈ R𝑑 to a layer of 𝑙 neurons, 𝑆 will be first mapped by T(·) into 𝑆 ′ ∈ R𝑙 where the dimension
𝑥𝑖 of x ∈ 𝑆 ′ is the input of 𝑖 𝑡ℎ neuron.

Unsafe space
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Fig. 2. Computation of exact reachable domain and identification of unsafe spaces.

Each ReLU neuron has two different linearities over its input range. For the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ neuron, it can be
denotes as 𝑥ˆ𝑖 = ReLU(𝑥𝑖 ) where for 𝑥𝑖 < 0, 𝑥ˆ𝑖 = 0 and for 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑥ˆ𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 . For the process E𝑖 (𝑆 ′) of
𝑆 ′ with the 𝑖th neuron, there are totally three different cases. The first one is that 𝑆 ′ only locates in
the range 𝑥𝑖 < 0. In this case, the dimension 𝑥𝑖 of all x ∈ 𝑆 ′ will be set to 0, which is equivalent to
an affine mapping on 𝑆 ′. The second case is that 𝑆 ′ only locates in the range 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0, where 𝑆 ′ will
stay unchanged. The third case is that 𝑆 ′ spans the two ranges. In this case, 𝑆 ′ will be divided into
two subsets by a hyperplane H : 𝑥𝑖 = 0, with each of subsets lying in one range 𝑥𝑖 < 0 or 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0.
Then, on each subset, either the first or second case is applied.
Overall, the process for one input set with a neuron can generate at most 2 sets. These sets will
be subsequently processed with another neuron until all the neurons in the layer are considered.
Let the computation of one layer be denoted as L(·). It then can be formulated as in Equation 1
where 𝑙 denotes the number of neurons. The order in which the neurons in a layer are processed is
not important. Given an input set 𝑆, in the worst case, it can output 𝑂 (2𝑙 ) sets. Based on Equation 1,
the output reachable domain of a DNN can be computed layer by layer as in Equation 2 where 𝑘
denotes the number of layers. Suppose the DNN includes 𝑛 ReLU neurons, it will generate 𝑂 (2𝑛 )
reachable sets.
L(𝑆) = (E𝑙 ◦ · · · ◦ E2 ◦ E1 ◦ T) (𝑆)
(1)
N(𝑆) = (L𝑘 ◦ · · · ◦ L2 ◦ L1 ) (𝑆)
(2)
Since different linearities of a ReLU neuron are separately considered in each E(·), the computation of output reachable sets of a DNN is also equivalent to the reachability analysis for linear
regions of the DNN. A linear region of a piecewise function like ReLU DNNs refers to the maximum
convex subset of the input space, on which the function is linear. Taking this fact into account, the
work [Yang et al. 2021a] proposes the set representation FVIM to track the connection between
reachable sets and their linear regions, such that for any output sets that violates safe properties
can be backtracked to its linear region and thus can identify the unsafe input space.
In order to compute the unsafe input domain, which is needed for DNN repair, we need to first
compute the 𝑂 (2𝑛 ) reachable sets. In practice, only a portion of these reachable sets may violate
safety specifications and a large amount of the computation is wasted on the safe reachable sets.
Therefore, to improve the computational efficiency, we develop a method to filter out such sets and
avoid additional computation.
Remark 3.1. Our reachability analysis algorithm, in the worst case, will require computation of
𝑂 (2𝑛 ) reachable sets with 𝑛 ReLU neurons in N(·) and B(·). We aim to develop an over-approximation
method to verify the safety of sets computed in Equation 1, such that we can filter out the safe set that
will not violate the properties Ps and avoid unnecessary subsequent computation.
To solve this problem, we propose an algorithm that integrates an over-approximation method
with the exact analysis method. Over-approximation methods can quickly check the safety of an
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input set to DNNs. The integration is done as follows. Before an input set 𝑆 is processed in a layer
L(·), its safety will be first verified with the over-approximation method. If it is safe, it will be
discarded, otherwise, it continues with the exact reachability method. Suppose there are 𝑚 ReLU
neurons involved in the computation in Equation 2, then it can generate 𝑂 (2𝑚 ) reachable sets
whose computation can be avoided if 𝑆 is verified safe. The integration of the over-approximation
algorithm also improves the memory footprint of the algorithm since a large number of sets are
discarded early in the process. Another problem of the method based on Equation 1 and 2 is the
memory-efficiency issue. As introduced, their computation may take up tremendous amount of the
computational memory, may even result in out-of-memory issues, due to the exponential explore
of sets. To solve this problem, the algorithm above is designed with the depth-first search, by which
the memory usage can be largely reduced. The details of the over-approximation algorithm are
presented in Section 5.3.
3.3

DNN Repair for Deep Reinforcement Learning

In deep reinforcement learning (DRL), an agent is replaced with a DNN controller. The inputs to
the DNN are states or observations, and their outputs correspond to agent actions. A property P
for the DNN agent defines a scenario where it specifies an input state space I𝑖𝑛 containing all
possible inputs, and also a domain U of undesired output actions. Here, safety is associated with an
input-output specification and reachability analysis refers to the process of determining whether
a learned DNN agent violates any of its specifications and also the computation of unsafe state
domain. This is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.5 (Safe Agent). Given multiple safety properties {P𝑖 }𝑛𝑖 for a DNN agent N , the
learned agent is safe if and only if for any P𝑖 , the reachable domain O [𝑖 ] for its input state space I𝑖𝑛[𝑖 ]
by O [𝑖 ] = N(I𝑖𝑛[𝑖 ] ) does not overlap with its unsafe action space U [𝑖 ] , namely, O [𝑖 ] ∩ U [𝑖 ] = ∅.
An unsafe agent has the state domains O𝑢 where their states will result in unsafe actions. Since the
traditional adversarial training is usually for regular DNN training algorithms with existing training
data, how to utilize such states or adversarial examples in DRL to repair unsafe behaviors remains
a problem. By considering the fact that DRL learns optimal policies in interactive environments
by maximizing the expectation of rewards, one promising way will be introducing penalty to the
occurrence of unsafe actions during the learning, such that safety can also be naturally learned from
the unsafe state domain. This strategy can also ensure the compatibility with the DRL algorithms,
such that they can be seamlessly integrated. Its details are presented in Section 4.1.
4

FRAMEWORK FOR DNN REPAIR

In this section, we propose a solution to Problem 3.1. The primary idea of our approach is to utilize
reachability analysis to incorporate adversarial information into the training process. Different
from regular adversarial training which obtains adversarial examples from random attacks, we
consider the entire adversarial region by selecting representative examples which are sufficient to
represent the region. The general approach is shown in Figure 3. The retraining process consist
of several epochs. For each epoch, reachability analysis, as described in Figure 2, is conducted to
compute the exact unsafe input domain I𝑢 and its unsafe output reachable domain O𝑢 for each
safety property in {P}𝑛𝑖=1 . I𝑢 and O𝑢 together are named unsafe data domain, which is formally
defined in Definition 4.1. Then data pairs (x, y) with x ∈ I𝑢 and y ∈ O𝑢 which sufficiently represent
the unsafe input domain are selected. The selection process is presented next. After determining
the representative data pairs, the unsafe output y for a particular adversarial example needs to be
corrected before adding it to the original training data. This correction normally requires a safe
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model as a reference. But in practice, this reference model is usually not available. Therefore, we
propose two alternatives for the correction step. One is achieved by editing the unsafe y to its
closest safe ŷ in the reachable space. The other is for the DRL where unsafe data pairs of the state
and action will be penalized through rewards, such that safety can be naturally learned along with
the optimal policies. The first case is presented next.
Unsafe Data
Domain ( x , y)

Correction

Safe Data
Domain (x , ^y )
Merge

Safe Data
Domain (x , y)

Merge

Training Data

Train

Model
Candidate

Reachability Analysis

Fig. 3. Framework for neural network repair.

Definition 4.1 (Unsafe Data Domain and UnsafeÐData Pair). Given the unsafe input domain
I𝑢 of a DNN N onÐthe safety property P with I𝑢 = 𝑚
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑘 , the unsafe reachable domain O𝑢 is
computed by O𝑢 = 𝑚
𝑂
where
𝑂
=
N(𝐼
)
as
described
in Definition 3.4. Then the pair I𝑢 and O𝑢
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
is defined as the unsafe data domain of the DNN on the property P, containing unsafe data pairs (x, y)
with x ∈ I𝑢 , y = N (x) ∈ O𝑢 .
Given a DNN with 𝑛 safety properties and a set of 𝑙 training data pair (x, y)s, the DNN repair
problem to satisfy all 𝑛 properties as well as maintain its performance is formulated as
minimize
𝜃

𝑛
 ∑︁

max 𝐿(𝑓𝜃 (x), ŷ) +

𝑙
∑︁

[𝑖 ]

𝑖=1 x∈I𝑢

𝐿(𝑓𝜃 (x 𝑗 ), y 𝑗 )


(3)

𝑗=1

where 𝑓 denotes DNN, 𝜃 denotes the weight parameters, and ŷ represents the optimal safe output
for the correction of y in the unsafe data pair (x, y) on property P𝑖 , and this correction refers to
the correction procedure in Figure 3. Without safe model references for repair, we set ŷ to be the
closest safe data to y in the space, on which ∥y − ŷ∥ is minimal. The problem of finding ŷ can be
encoded as a LP problem of finding a ŷ on the boundaries of U [𝑖 ] such that the distance between ŷ
and y is minimal, where the optimal ŷ is located on one of its boundaries along its normal vector
from y. Let the vector from y to ŷ along the normal vector be denoted as Δy. Then, the problem of
finding ŷ can be formulated as
ŷ = y + (1 + 𝛼)Δy,

min ∥y − ŷ∥

(4)

^∉U [𝑖 ]
y

where 𝛼 is a very small positive scalar to divert ŷ from the boundary of U [𝑖 ] into the safe domain.
The y ∈ O𝑢[𝑖 ] that leads to the maximum loss value for the interior maximization of Equation 3
is from the extreme points of O𝑢[𝑖 ] , namely, its vertices, because this loss is associated with the
maximum distance Δy among y ∈ O𝑢[𝑖 ] . Let 𝑉𝑆 be the set of vertices of O𝑢[𝑖 ] , and 𝑉𝑘 be the set
Ð
Ð𝑚
of vertices of 𝑂𝑘 where 𝑂𝑘 = N(𝐼𝑘 ). Since O𝑢[𝑖 ] = 𝑚
𝑘=1 𝑂 𝑘 then 𝑉𝑆 ⊆
𝑘=1 𝑉𝑘 . Recall that an
unsafe input set 𝐼𝑘 is a linear region of the DNN, over which the DNN is linear. Therefore, 𝑂𝑘 is
essentially an affine mapping from 𝐼𝑘 and the vertices of 𝐼𝑘 one-to-one correspond to 𝑉𝑘 of 𝑂𝑘 . We
Ð
can conclude that the vertices of unsafe input sets {𝐼 }𝑚
contain the optimal x ∈ I𝑢[𝑖 ] = 𝑚
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑘
𝑘=1
for the interior maximization of Equation 3. Moreover, vertices are sufficient to represent a convex
domain. Therefore, the vertices of unsafe input sets {𝐼 }𝑚
can sufficiently represent the unsafe
𝑘=1
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input domain I𝑢[𝑖 ] , and data pairs (x, y) where x belongs to the vertices of {𝐼 }𝑚
and y belongs
𝑘=1
to the vertices {𝑂 }𝑚
can
represent
the
unsafe
data
domain.
These
data
pairs
will
be selected to
𝑘=1
merge into the training data for the adversarial training, which is the merge procedure in Figure 3.
The framework is also described in Algorithm 1. To maintain the performance of the repaired
DNN, a threshold is also included in Line 5. Function reachAnalysis is used to compute all the
safe and unsafe data domains of a DNN on multiple safety properties. Lines 4 and 7 generate
representative data pairs for the adversarial training in Line 10. Function Correction applies a
correction on y corresponding to Equation 4.
Algorithm 1 DNN Repair
Input: N , (x, y)training # an unsafe DNN and its training data
Output: N ′ # an safe DNN satisfying all its safety properties with a desired performance
1: procedure N ′ = Repair(N )
2:
N′ ← N
3:
while true do
4:
Dunsafe , Dsafe = reachAnalysis(N , {P}𝑚
# compute unsafe and safe data domains
𝑖=1 )
5:
if Dunsafe is empty and A (N ′) − A (N ) ≥ 𝜀 then # A: performance function
6:
break and return N ′
7:
(x, y)safe , (x, y)unsafe = Vertices(Dunsafe , Dsafe ) # representative data pairs
8:
(x, ŷ) = Correction((x, y)unsafe )
9:
merge (x, ŷ), (x, y)safe to (x, y)training
10:
N ′ = Update(N ′, (x, y)training )

4.1

Framework for Deep Reinforcement Learning

DRL is a machine learning technique where a DNN agent learns in an interactive environment
from its own experience. Our framework aims to repair an unsafe agent which violates its safety
properties while performance is maintained. The difference of the framework for DRL with the
general framework in Figure 3 is the correction of y in unsafe data pairs (x, y). The correction in
this modified framework is achieved by introducing a penalty to the unsafe data pair observed in
the learning process, from which safety can be learned. In the following, we introduce the repair
framework for DRL.
In a regular learning process, in each time step, the agent computes the action and the next
state based on the current state. A reward is assigned to the state transition. This transition is
denoted as a tuple ⟨𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑟, 𝑠 ′⟩ where 𝑠 is the current state, 𝑎 is the action, 𝑠 ′ is the next state, and 𝑟 is
the reward. Then, this tuple together with previous experience is used to update the agent. The
sequence of time steps from the beginning with an initial state to the end of the task is called an
episode. With appropriate parameters settings, the performance of an agent may gradually converge
to the optimum after a number of episodes. A good learning also relies on effective policy-learning
algorithms. The DRL approach in this work considers one of the most popular algorithms, the
deep deterministic policy gradients algorithm (DDPG) [Lillicrap et al. 2015] and is utilized on the
rocket-lander benchmark 1 inspired by the lunar lander [Brockman et al. 2016].
As introduced, the correction of unsafe data pairs (x, y) is achieved through self-learning by
assigning penalty to unsafe behaviors. Here, x refers to the state input 𝑠 to the DNN agent and
y refers to its output action 𝑎. The new framework is shown in Figure 4. Similar to the general
framework, given an unsafe agent candidate in Figure 4(a), our reachability analysis method
1 https://github.com/arex18/rocket-lander
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Generate

Termination

Empty?

One Episode
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the environment

Add

Train

A Set of
<s,a,r,s’>

<s,a,r,s’>

Select

New Experiences
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(b)

Fig. 4. Repair framework for deep reinforcement learning. The loop in (a) represents one epoch. Given an
unsafe agent, its unsafe state space is computed with our reachability analysis method, Then, eposides are
run with unsafe state as initial states to update the agent, where occurrence of unsafe states will be penalized.
In (b), the new experiences refer to the experience learned during the repair while the old experiences refer to
the ones learned in learning of the original agent.

computes the unsafe state domain that lead to a wrong action by the agent. The vertices of unsafe
state sets {𝐼 }𝑚
are selected as representative unsafe states for the unsafe domain. The correction
𝑘=1
of the wrong action 𝑎 for an unsafe state 𝑠 will be achieved by running one episode with the unsafe
state as an initial state as shown in Figure 4(b). The process of one episode is similar to the regular
episode. The difference is that a new penalty 𝑟 is incorporated for any unsafe pair 𝑠 and 𝑎 in each
time step. The penalty 𝑟 is normally being set to the least reward in the old experience, where the
old experiences refers to the experience from learning the original unsafe agent. In the repair, the
𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒 in each time step will be stored into a global buffer for previous experience, which is named
new experiences. For training, a set of tuples will be randomly selected from both experiences. The
process in Figure 4(a) will be repeated until the agent becomes safe and its performance is above
a predefined threshold. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2 where Function singleEpisode
corresponds to Figure 2(b).
Algorithm 2 Repair for Deep Reinforcement Learning
Input: N , 𝐸 # an unsafe DNN agent, and its old experience, a set of tuples
Output: N ′ # a safe DNN satisfying all its safety properties with a desired performance
1: procedure N ′ = Repair(N )
2:
N′ ← N
3:
while true do
4:
Dunsafe = reachAnalysis(N , {P}𝑚
# compute unsafe and safe data domains
𝑖=1 )
5:
if Dunsafe is empty and A (N ′) − A (N ) ≥ 𝜀 then # A: performance function
6:
break and return N ′
7:
𝑆 unsafe = Vertices(Dunsafe ) # representative unsafe states
8:
for s in 𝑆 unsafe do
9:
N ′ = singleEpisode(N ′, s, 𝐸) # one episode learning with initial state 𝑠 and 𝐸.

5

REACHABILITY ANALYSIS OF DNN

Fast reachability analysis is a core component in our DNN repair framework. However, different
from traditional algorithms, for DNN repair the emphasis of the algorithm is on finding the
unsafe input domain and it’s corresponding unsafe output domain. Our algorithm builds on the
reachability analysis and backtracking method presented in [Yang et al. 2021a]. The method utilizes
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a FVIM set representation for efficient encoding of the combinatorial structure of polytopes. This
set representation is suitable for set transformations that are induced by operations in a neural
network. The reachability analysis method presented in [Yang et al. 2021a] is able to compute the
output reachable domain of a DNN, and subsequently identify the unsafe input regions. However,
one disadvantage of the algorithm is that, in the worst case, the number of reachable sets is 𝑂 (2𝑛 ),
where 𝑛 is the number of ReLU neurons. Its efficiency could be impeded due to this computation of
a huge number of sets.
To alleviate this problem, we utilize an novel over-approximation method to speed up computation
in Equation 1 and 2 by filtering out safe regions in the early stages of the algorithm. Since our
focus of retraining is on computing the unsafe input domain and it’s corresponding unsafe output
domain, once we have guarantees of safety for a particular region, we do not need to compute its
exact output reachable sets. Thereby, the computational efficiency and the memory footprint of the
algorithm can be significantly improved.
Our over-approximation method is based on a new set representation for the linear relaxation
of ReLU neurons. The new set representation named V-zono is designed to efficiently encode
the exponentially increasing vertices of sets in each linear relaxation, and it is totally compatible
with the FVIM. In the following section, the over approximation with V-zono will be introduced.
Additionally, to handle the memory-efficiency issue caused by the large amount of sets computed
in Equation 1 and 2, a depth-first search algorithm is also presented.
5.1

Over Approximation with Linear Relaxation

This section presents our over-approximation method based on the linear relaxation of ReLU.
Linear relaxation is commonly used in other related works for fast safety verification of DNNs,
such as [Gehr et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2018]. Instead of considering the two
different linearities of ReLU neuron over its input in E(·) of Equation 1, these works apply one
convex domain to over approximate these linearities to simplify the reachability analysis, as shown
in Figure 5. This over approximation is named linear relaxation. Recall the process of 𝑆 ′ with the 𝑖th
neuron in the layer in Section 3.2, when the lower bound and the upper bound of the 𝑥𝑖 of x ∈ 𝑆 ′
spans the two linearities bounded by 𝑥𝑖 =0, 𝑆 ′ is supposed to be divided accordingly and their two
subsets lying in the range 𝑥𝑖 < 0 or 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 will be processed in terms of their linearity. The linear
relaxation is applied only in such cases as shown in Figure 5 (b) and (c). When 𝑆 ′ only locates in
𝑥𝑖 < 0 or 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0, the computation will be the same as the computation in Section 3.2. We denote
this process including the linear relaxation as E𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·), and the computation of one layer as L𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·).
Thus, by simply substituting E(·) with E𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·) in Equation 1, and substituting L(·) with L𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·) in
Equation 2, we can conduct the over-approximation method shown in Equation 5 and 6. Function
E𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·) only generates one output set for each input set instead of at most two sets. Therefore,
given one input set to the DNN, Equation 6 computes one over-approximated output reachable set
instead of 𝑂 (2𝑛 ) sets with 𝑛 ReLU neurons.
𝑎𝑝𝑝

L𝑎𝑝𝑝 (𝑆) = (E𝑙
N(𝑆) =

𝑎𝑝𝑝
(L𝑘

𝑎𝑝𝑝

◦ · · · ◦ E2
◦···◦

𝑎𝑝𝑝
L2

𝑎𝑝𝑝

◦ E1
◦

◦ T) (𝑆)

𝑎𝑝𝑝
L1 ) (𝑆)

(5)
(6)

Here we introduce two of the most common types of linear relaxations for ReLU functions as
shown in (b) and (c) of Figure 5. The linear relaxation in (b) uses the minimum convex bound.
Compared to other linear relaxations, it can over approximate the output reachable domain with the
least conservativeness. A less conservative relaxation typically leads to more accurate reachability
analysis algorithms. The primary challenge for this relaxation is the estimation of the lower bound
𝑙𝑏 and the upper bound 𝑢𝑏 for each ReLU activation function. This is normally formulated as an LP
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Fig. 5. Linear relaxations of ReLU functions with a convex bound: (a) ReLU function, (b) one type of linear
relaxation of ReLU function [Wong and Kolter 2018], and (c) linear relaxation utilized in our over-approximation
method based on a new set representation.

problem. However, since the number of variables equals to the number of activations, solving such
problems with traditional methods for each verification may not be tractable.
One alternative to avoid the LP problems is to use vertices to represent a set, This also enables
us to easily integrate this representation with the FVIM set representation in the exact reachability
analysis. One issue with this approach is that doubling of vertices in each ReLU relaxation may add
a significant computation cost and memory occupation. The explanation is as follows. Suppose the
relaxation is for the 𝑖th neuron. As shown in (b) and (c), the relaxation introduces an unknown
variable 𝑥ˆ𝑖 to the incoming set 𝑆 ∈ R𝑑 and also the relation between 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥ˆ𝑖 bounded in the
convex domain.
Remark 5.1. The introduction of 𝑥ˆ𝑖 is equivalent to projecting 𝑆 into 𝑆ℎ in (𝑑+1)-dimensional space.
For each x ∈ 𝑆, it will transform into xℎ ∈ 𝑆ℎ with xℎ =[x; 𝑥ˆ𝑖 ] ∈ R𝑑+1 . Accordingly, the faces of 𝑆
will transform into new faces of 𝑆ℎ with increasing their dimension by one. The new faces of 𝑆ℎ are
unbounded because of the unknown variable 𝑥ˆ𝑖 . The later intersection of 𝑆ℎ with the domain of 𝑥𝑖 and
𝑥ˆ𝑖 in the relaxation will yield real values to 𝑥ˆ𝑖 .
For instance, the vertex v of 𝑆 which is a 0-dimensional face will turn into vℎ =[v; 𝑥ˆ𝑖 ] which is
equivalent to an unbounded edge of 𝑆ℎ , a 1-dimensional face. With 𝑆ℎ and the linear relaxation
𝑎𝑝𝑝
bounds of 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥ˆ𝑖 , E𝑖 (𝑆) can be interpreted as the intersection of 𝑆ℎ with these bounds.
Remark 5.2. The convex bounds of the ReLU relaxation consists of multiple linear constraint 𝑙s. Each
𝑙 : 𝛼 · x + 𝛽 ≤ 0 is one of two halfspaces divided by the hyperplane H : 𝛼 · x + 𝛽=0. The intersection of
𝑆ℎ with each 𝑙 is essentially identifying the subset of 𝑆ℎ which is generated from division of 𝑆ℎ by H
and locates in the halfspace 𝑙.
Take the (b) relaxation for instance which is bounded by three linear constraints 𝑙 1 , 𝑙 2 and 𝑙 3 .
(𝑆) can be formulated as

𝑎𝑝𝑝

E𝑖

𝑎𝑝𝑝

E𝑖

(𝑆) = 𝑆ℎ ∩ {x ∈ R𝑑 | 𝑙 1 ∩ 𝑙 2 ∩ 𝑙 3 }.

(7)

As introduced above the vertex vℎ =[v; 𝑥ˆ𝑖 ] of 𝑆ℎ is symbolic with 𝑥ˆ𝑖 and is equivalent to an unbounded edge. In a bounded set, an edge includes two vertices. After the intersection of 𝑆ℎ with
𝑎𝑝𝑝
the linear constraints, E𝑖 (𝑆) generates a bounded subset of 𝑆ℎ and meanwhile, each symbolic vℎ
will yield to two real vertices. Therefore, the vertices of 𝑆ℎ is doubled from the vertices of 𝑆.

H1




 H2

 H3



H
 4

: (𝑢𝑏 − 𝑙𝑏) · 𝑥ˆ − 𝑢𝑏 · 𝑥 + 𝑢𝑏 · 𝑙𝑏 = 0
: (𝑢𝑏 − 𝑙𝑏) · 𝑥ˆ − 𝑢𝑏 · 𝑥 = 0
: 𝑥 − 𝑢𝑏 = 0
: 𝑥 − 𝑙𝑏 = 0

(8)
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To solve this problem, it is necessary to develop a new set representation that can efficiently
encode the exponential explosion of vertices with ReLU relaxations. Here, we choose the relaxation
in Figure 5(c) because the convex bound for the relaxation is a zonotope which can be simply represented by a set of finite vectors and is formulated as a Minkowski sum. An efficient representation
of vertices can benefit from this simplification. The explanation is as follows. The zonotope in
(c) is bounded by two pairs of parallel supporting hyperplanes, H1, H2 and H3, H4 as shown in
Equation 8, and their linear constraints are denoted as 𝑙 1 , 𝑙 2 , 𝑙 3 and 𝑙 4 . Since 𝑙 3 and 𝑙 4 are lower
and upper bounds of the 𝑥𝑖 in 𝑆 and 𝑆 itself locates in these constraints, then, the left part of
the conjunction in Equation 7 can be replaced with {x ∈ R𝑛 | 𝑙 1 ∩ 𝑙 2 }. For each symbolic vertex
vℎ =[v; 𝑥ˆ𝑖 ], two new vertices v1′ and v2′ can be computed from the intersection of the hyperplanes
H1 and H2 with 𝑥ˆ𝑖 involved. The vertices v1′ and v2′ are shown in Equation 9 where 𝑥𝑖 equals to
the 𝑣𝑖 of v.




v
v
′
′
v1 = 𝑢𝑏 ·𝑥𝑖 −𝑢𝑏 ·𝑙𝑏 , v2 = 𝑢𝑏 ·𝑥𝑖
(9)
𝑢𝑏−𝑙𝑏

(
{v1′ , v2′ }

=

v𝑐′

±

v𝑣′ ,

v𝑐′


=

𝑢𝑏 ·𝑣𝑖
𝑢𝑏−𝑙𝑏

𝑢𝑏−𝑙𝑏



)
v
0
′
, v𝑣 = 𝑢𝑏 ·𝑙𝑏
𝑢𝑏 ·𝑙𝑏
− 2 (𝑢𝑏−𝑙𝑏)
2 (𝑢𝑏−𝑙𝑏)

(10)

These two vertices can also be represented by Equation 10 where v𝑣′ is a constant vector for the
𝑎𝑝𝑝
𝑎𝑝𝑝
ReLU relaxation E𝑖 (𝑆). Let the vertices of 𝑆 be 𝑉 and 𝑆 ′=E𝑖 (𝑆), then for each v ∈ 𝑉 it yields
′
′
′
′
one v𝑐 for the vertices 𝑉 of 𝑆 . Let the set of v𝑐 be denoted as 𝑉𝑐′, then 𝑉 ′ can be represented as
Equation 11 where the doubled vertices are represented by plus-minus with the vector v𝑣′ .
𝑉 ′ = 𝑉𝑐′ ± v𝑣′

(11)

The relaxation is illustrated by in Figure 6. The layer includes 2 ReLU neurons. The input set
𝑆 is 2-dimensional with x=[𝑥 1, 𝑥 2 ] ⊤ ∈ 𝑆, and its vertices 𝑉 consists of v1 , v2 and v3 . Here, 𝑥 1 , 𝑥 2
respectively corresponds to the input of the first neuron and the second neuron. In this example,
the process of 𝑆 w.r.t. the first neuron is demonstrated. We can notice that the lower bound and the
upper bound of 𝑥 1 in 𝑆 are 𝑙𝑏= − 1 and 𝑢𝑏=1, which indicates that 𝑆 spans the input range of ReLU
function over which the function exhibits two different linearities. Therefore, the linear relaxation
is applied in terms of the subfigure (b). As introduced above, there are four linear constraints 𝑙 1 , 𝑙 2 ,
𝑙 3 and 𝑙 4 bounding this relaxation of 𝑥 1 and 𝑥ˆ1 , whose hyperplanes can be computed by Equation 8.
The introduction of new variable 𝑥ˆ1 projects 2-dimensional 𝑆 into 3-dimensional 𝑆ℎ with x ∈ 𝑆
transforming into xℎ =[x; 𝑥ˆ1 ] ∈ 𝑆ℎ . Accordingly, the vertices v1 , v2 and v3 of 𝑆 transform into new
symbolic vertices [−1, 2, 𝑥ˆ1 ] ⊤ , [−1, 0, 𝑥ˆ1 ] ⊤ and [1, 0, 𝑥ˆ1 ] ⊤ as shown in the subfigure (c), which are
equivalent to three unbounded edges of 𝑆ℎ . After the intersection of 𝑆ℎ with those linear constraints,
we obtain the final over-approximated set 𝑆 ′ represented by the red domain in the subfigure (d)
with its 6 vertices represented by the red points. According to Equation 10 and 11, the vertices 𝑉 ′
of 𝑆 can be represented as
(
(  −1   −1   1  )
𝑥 1 
 0 )
 

 
 



′
′
′
′
′
′
𝑥 2  ∈ 𝑉 , 𝑉 = v ± v
v𝑐 ∈  2  ,  0  ,  0  , v𝑣 =  0 
(12)
𝑐
𝑣
 
𝑥ˆ1 
−0.25 −0.25 0.75
0.25
 

 
 



′
′
′
′
where v𝑐 s are denoted as {v𝑐 1, v𝑐 2, v𝑐 2 } and described by the dark points in (d).
5.2

Over approximation with V−zono

In the previous section, the a new set representation is preliminarily derived for the linear relaxation
in Figure 5(c). This section mainly presents the formal definition of the set representation V-zono,
and its utilization in the over approximation of DNNs in Equation 5. The utilization includes the
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Fig. 6. Example of the linear relaxation.

linear relaxation of ReLU neuron E𝑎𝑝𝑝 (·), the affine mapping T(·), as well as the safety verification
on the safety properties of DNNs.
The V-zono shares similarities with the V-representation of polytopes introduced in Section 2,
but it can efficiently encode exponentially increasing vertices. It is formally defined in Definition 5.1.
It consists of base vertices C and base vectors V. An example of the vertices representation is
demonstrated in Figure 6(d). The convex set is the red domain. Its base vertices include three v𝑐′
and the base vectors includes one v𝑣′ as shown in Equation 12. Suppose C contains 𝑚 base vertices
and V contains 𝑛 base vectors, then C ± V efficiently represents 𝑚 × 2𝑛 vertices in Equation 13.
Definition 5.1 (V-zono). In the vertices representation, the set C that contains a set of finite
real points v𝑐 ∈ R𝑑 is named as Base Vertices, and the set V that contains a set of finite real vectors
v𝑣 ∈ R𝑑 is named Base Vectors. Then ⟨C, V⟩ can represent a convex set 𝑆 ⊂ R𝑑 where C ± V encodes
all its vertices.
𝑛
∑︁
C ± V = {v𝑐 +
(±v𝑣,𝑖 ) | v𝑐 ∈ C and V = {v𝑣,1, v𝑣,2, . . . , v𝑣,𝑛 }}
(13)
𝑖=1

5.2.1 Linear Relaxation with V-zono. In the application of V-zono in ReLU relaxation, the vertex
𝑎𝑝𝑝
computation in E𝑖 (𝑆) has been formulated as Equation 10, which deals with regular vertices not
represented by V-zono. Here, we will formally present the linear relaxation with V-zono where
𝑎𝑝𝑝
given an input set 𝑆 in V-zono, the V-zono of 𝑆 ′ = E𝑖 (𝑆) will be computed. Suppose the V-zono
of 𝑆 has base vertices C and base vectors V. In terms of Equation 10, a new base vertex v𝑐′ can be
computed for each v by
 
𝑢𝑏 · 𝑣𝑖
𝑢𝑏 · 𝑙𝑏
v
′
v𝑐 =
, 𝛾=
−
, v ∈ 𝑉 and 𝑉 = C ± V.
𝛾
𝑢𝑏 − 𝑙𝑏 2(𝑢𝑏 − 𝑙𝑏)
Each v𝑐′ is computed by incorporating one new dimension to each v ∈ 𝑉 with a real value 𝛾, which
is essentially adding one new dimension to each v𝑐 ∈ C with 𝛾, and adding one new dimension to
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each v𝑣 ∈ V with zero. Accordingly, all the new base vertices v𝑐′ s can be computed as
)
( 
 !
𝑛
∑︁
v𝑐
v𝑣,𝑖
v𝑐 ∈ C and v𝑣,𝑖 ∈ V .
+
±
𝛾
0
𝑖=1

Based on the equation above, Equation 10 can be extended from the computation of new vertices
v′s for one v to all v ∈ 𝑉 . The vertices 𝑉 ′ of 𝑆 ′ can be computed as below, from which we can
derive the C ′ and V ′ as shown in Equation 14.
( 
)
 !
𝑛
∑︁
v𝑐
v𝑣,𝑖
+
±
± v𝑣′ v𝑐 ∈ C, and v𝑣,𝑖 ∈ V
𝛾
0
𝑖=1
( 
)
( 
)
v𝑐
v𝑣
′
′
′
C =
v𝑐 ∈ C , V =
, v𝑣 v𝑣 ∈ V
(14)
𝛾
0
𝑎𝑝𝑝

From Equation 14, we notice that with the linear relaxation of each ReLU neuron E𝑖 (·), the
dimension of vertices in V-zono will be increased by one because by introducing the new dimension
or variable 𝑥ˆ𝑖 the old dimension 𝑥𝑖 still remains. It will result in the dimension inconsistency with the
subsequent affine mapping between layers. This old dimension can be eliminated with projecting
the set 𝑆 ′ on it by replacing the old dimension 𝑥𝑖 in the vertices with the new 𝑥ˆ𝑖 . The projection is
reflected on Equation 15 with the updated C ′ and V ′.
C ′ = {v𝑐 | ∀v𝑐 ∈ C, v𝑐 [𝑖] = 𝛾 },

V ′ = {v𝑣 , v𝑣′ | ∀v𝑣 ∈ V, v𝑣 [𝑖] = 0}

(15)

C′ ± V′

After the projection, part of the points
will become the actual vertices of the projected set
and the rest will become its interior points. The projection of a polytope 𝑆 into a lower-dimensional
space will generate another polytope 𝑆𝑙 whose every face is a projection of a face of 𝑆. It indicates
that the vertices 𝑉𝑙 of 𝑆𝑙 are from the projection of subset of the vertices 𝑉 of 𝑆. Since after the
projection Equation 15 preserves all projected vertices from Equation 14, there are redundant
points in Equation 15 which are not vertices but only interior points of the projected polytope. This
redundancy is allowed in the vertices representations of polytopes, as well as our set representation
V-zono. The detection and elimination of this redundancy requires and additional algorithm, which
is out of the scope of this work and will be our future work. In addition, since V-zono can efficiently
encode vertices, the redundancy issue will not greatly affect the efficiency of the algorithm, which
is also demonstrated in the experiments.
x^1

v'c3

S'
v'c2

v'c1

(-1, 0, -0.25)

(-1, 2, -0.25)

x2

S''

v'c1 (-0.25,2)

(1, 0, 0.75)

x2

x^1

v'c2 (-0.25,0) v'c3 (0.75,0)
x1

(d)

(e)

Fig. 7. Example of the linear relaxation.

An example of the projection of the set 𝑆 ′ in Figure 5(d) is shown in Figure 7. In the ReLU
relaxation, the 𝑥 1 is the old dimension and 𝑥ˆ1 is the new one, therefore, the set will be projected on
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the dimension 𝑥 1 which will maintain the exact bounded relation between 𝑥ˆ1 and 𝑥 2 . The projection
generates another polytope represented by the red domain in (e). Its V-zono for the vertices is
 


 
 



𝑥ˆ1
−0.25 −0.25 0.75
0.25
∈ 𝑉 ′′, 𝑉 ′′ = v𝑐′′ ± v𝑣′′ v𝑐′′ ∈
,
,
, v𝑣′′ =
.
(16)
𝑥2
2
0
0
0
As shown in (d), its V-zono contains 6 vertices denoted as red dots. After the projection as shown
in (e), the new V-zono contains 6 points which are the projections of these 6 vertices. 4 of them
are actual the vertices of 𝑆 ′′ and the rest 2 points are redundant.
5.2.2 Affine Mapping with V-zono. As shown in Equation 5, the over approximation of reachable
domain also includes affine mapping T (𝑊 ,𝑏) (·) between layers by weights 𝑊 and bias 𝑏. As introduced in Section 2, affine mapping on a set 𝑆 only changes the value of its vertices. Suppose the
vertices 𝑉 of 𝑆 is represented by C ± V, then T (𝑊 ,𝑏) (𝑆) on 𝑉 can be formulated as
𝑊 · 𝑉 + 𝑏 = 𝑊 · (C ± V) + 𝑏
(17)

= 𝑊 · C + 𝑏 ± 𝑊 · V.
The new C ′, V ′ for new vertices 𝑉 ′ after the affine mapping are
C ′ = 𝑊 · C + 𝑏 = {𝑊 · v𝑐 + 𝑏 | v𝑐 ∈ C}

(18)

V ′ = 𝑊 · V = {𝑊 · v𝑣 | v𝑣 ∈ C}.

5.2.3 Safety Verification with V-zono. The safety verification problem is to determine whether
an output reachable domain overlaps with the unsafe domain bounded by linear constraints. Let
one linear constraint be denoted as 𝑙 : 𝛼 ⊤ · x + 𝛽 ≤ 0. Suppose vertices 𝑉 of the over approximated
output domain are represented by C ± V and V = {v𝑣,1, v𝑣,2, . . . , v𝑣,𝑛 }. Then, the verification of 𝑉
w.r.t. the linear constraint 𝑙 can transform into checking if the minimum value of 𝛼 ⊤ v + 𝛽 over the
vertices v ∈ 𝑉 is not positive, which is formulated as
minimize(𝛼 ⊤ (C ± V) + 𝛽).

(19)

The internal formula can be extended as
𝛼 ⊤ (C ± V) + 𝛽 = 𝛼 ⊤ C + 𝛽 ± 𝛼 ⊤ V = 𝛼 ⊤ C + 𝛽 +

𝑘
∑︁

±(𝛼 ⊤ v𝑣 ).

𝑖=1

𝛼 ⊤ v𝑐

Then for each v𝑐 ∈ C, we can compute its minimum
+ 𝛽 + 𝑖=1 -|𝛼 ⊤ v𝑣 |. By computing the
minimums of all v𝑐 ∈ C, we can determine the global minimum value in Equation 19 and thus
complete the safety verification.
5.3

Í𝑘

Fast Computation of Unsafe Input Spaces of DNNs

In the previous sections, an over-approximation method for the reachability analysis of DNNs based
on the linear relaxation of ReLU neurons is developed. The method is formulated as Equation 5 and 6.
As introduced, it is utilized to integrate with the exact analysis method formulated in Equation 1 and
2 to filter out all the safe intermediate sets that are computed in each L(·) and are not necessary for
the computation of unsafe input spaces for DNNs. In this section, the algorithm for such integration
will be presented. This algorithm is based on the depth-first search to handle the memory-efficiency
issue due to large amount of sets computed in each layer.
Algorithm 3 describes the integration of the computation of unsafe input spaces of DNNs with
the proposed over-approximation method. Given an input domain 𝑆, it can compute all the unsafe
input spaces w.r.t. the safety properties of the DNN. The details of each function are as follows.
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(1) Function Reach(·) is a recursive function which, in each recursion, computes only one of
input sets generated from the last layer to reduce the burden on the computational memory.
Its base case is Line 3-5 where the computation reaches to the last layer of the DNN and
unsafe input spaces will be computed. The recursion depth is the number of the DNN layers
(2) Function outputOverApp(·) over approximates the output domain of the DNN for each
input set which is computed from the last layer with the exact analysis method in Equation 1
and 2. This function corresponds to Equation 5 and 6. The details is shown in Algorithm 4.
In the beginning, the set 𝑆 represented by FVIM is transformed into the V-zono in Line 2.
Subsequently, in each layer, it will be first processed by the affine mapping in Line 4 which
corresponds to the T(·) in Equation 5 and the computation of C ′ and V ′ in Equation 18.
Then, in Line 5, it will be processed with ReLU neurons in the layer based on the linear
relaxation. This process corresponds to the each E𝑎𝑝𝑝 in Equation 5 and also the computation
of C ′ and V ′ in Equation 15.
(3) Function safetyCheck(·) checks the safety of the over-approximated output domain computed in Line 6 with respect to safety properties. This function corresponds to Equation 19
where the vertices of the output domain are checked with each linear constraints of the
unsafe domain defined in the properties. It returns unsafe if any vertex satisfies in all the
constraints, otherwise, safe. When 𝑆 is verified safe, the computation in the following layers
can be abandoned because 𝑆 will not lead to safety violation.
(4) Function layerOutput(·) computes the reachable sets for the current layer with input sets
computed from the previous layer, which corresponds to Equation 1 and 2. All sets in this
computation are represented by FVIMs. The details is shown in Algorithm 5.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is that given an input set to a DNN with 𝑛
ReLU neurons, 𝑂 (2𝑛 ) output reachable sets will be computed. In practice, the utilization of the
over approximation method can significantly reduce the amount and improve the computational
efficiency. The experimental results indicate that Algorithm 3 can be around five times faster than
the algorithm without the over-approximation method.

Algorithm 3 Computation of unsafe input spaces of a neural network
Input: 𝑆 # one input set to the neural network
Output: O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒 # O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒 : unsafe input spaces of the DNN
1: procedure O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒 = Reach(S, layer)
# 𝑆: an input set; 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 : the layer ID
2:
O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒 = 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦
3:
if layer == lastlayer then # lastlayer: the ID of the last layer
4:
unsafety = Backtrack(S) # unsafety: unsafe input space for the unsafe domain in 𝑆
5:
return unsafety
6:
overapp = outputOverApp(S) # overapp: over approximated output domain of the DNN
7:
if safetyCheck(overapp) then
8:
return None
9:
O𝑐 = layerOutput(S, layer) # O𝑐 : output reachable sets of the current layer for S
10:
for S in O𝑐 do
11:
O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒 .extend(Reach(S, layer+1))
12:

return O𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑓 𝑒
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Algorithm 4 Reachable-domain Over approximation of a neural network
Input: 𝑆 # one input set to the current layer
Output: O # one over approximated output reachable set of the current layer
1: procedure O = outputOverApp(S, layer)
2:
S = Vzono(S) # transform the FVIM representation of 𝑆 to the V-zono
3:
for layer = 1:lastlayer do
4:
S = affineMapping(S, layer) # update base vertices and base vectors
5:
S = reluLayerRelaxation(S) # relaxation of ReLU neurons
6:
return O ← 𝑆
Algorithm 5 Reachable set computation of one layer
Input: 𝑆 # one input set to the current layer
Output: O # output reachable sets of the current layer
1: procedure O = layerOutput(S, layer)
2:
O == 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦
3:
S = affineMapping(S, layer)
4:
if layer == lastlayer then
5:
return S
6:
O.extend(reluLayer(S)) # compute exact reachable sets with each ReLU neuron
7:
return O
6

EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluates the performance of the framework, including the performance of
the reachability analysis method. Recall from Section 4 that we consider two alternatives for
the correction of unsafe data in the absence of a safe model reference. The first case considers
transformations to the unsafe data points to the nearest safe set. The second case incorporates
repair as part of the learning process. We evaluate the first case with a well-known benchmark
named HorizontalCAS. HorizontalCAS is an airborne collision avoidance system, part of the ACAS
Xu family proposed by [Julian and Kochenderfer 2019]. HorizontalCAS has neural networks as
controllers. The code and training data for the benchmark are publicly available 2 , based on which we
train all DNNs. Unsafe DNNs will be first identified from these DNNs for the further repair with our
framework. For the second approach, we apply our framework for repair in safe deep reinforcement
learning on a well-known benchmark: the rocket lander based on the lunar lander [Brockman et al.
2016]. The hardware configuration is Intel Core i9-10900K CPU @3.7GHz×, 10-core and 20-thread
Processor, 128GB Memory, 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.
In addition to comparing with the related work [Yang et al. 2021a], our experimental evaluation
examines whether the repairing process can converge on the multiple safety properties, how
repairing unsafe behaviors on one property will affect other properties, and how the correction of
unsafe data to its closest safe data affects the behavior of repaired DNNs.
6.1

HorizontalCAS DNN Controller Repair

The original controller for the HorizontalCAS is based on a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
with large numeric tables [Julian and Kochenderfer 2019]. These controllers are replaced with
neural networks. This reduces the memory footprint significantly. There are five continuous
2 https://github.com/sisl/HorizontalCAS
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inputs and two discrete inputs, For each combination of the two discrete input values, one neural
network is trained. Overall, the controller consists of an array of 45 feed-forward neural networks.
Each neural network is denoted as 𝑁𝑖 𝑗 where 𝑖 is an integer index ranging in [1, 5] and 𝑗 is an
integer index ranging in [1, 9]. The input to each DNN is a 5 dimensional continuous sensor
measurement of the dynamics between the ownship and the intruder. The inputs are denoted as
[𝜌 (feet), 𝜃 (deg),𝜓 (deg), 𝑣 own (feet/s), 𝑣 int (feet/s)] and they are, respectively, the distance between
ownship and intruder, the angle of the ownship heading direction relative to intruder, angle of
intruder heading direction relative to ownship heading direction, velocity of ownship and velocity
of intruder. The lower bound and upper bound of their ranges is as follows:
𝑙𝑏 = [0, −𝜋, −𝜋, 100, 0];

𝑢𝑏 = [56000, 𝜋, 𝜋, 1000, 1000].

There are 5 outputs corresponding to 5 action advisories which are, respectively, clear of conflict,
weak right, strong right, weak left and strong left. The action with the maximum output will be
selected. Each neural network includes 300 ReLU neurons which are fully connected. And for each
neural network, there are several safety properties defined. In each safety property, for an input
domain, desired action advisories are defined to avoid aircraft collision.
All 45 neural networks are well trained with the provided training data and default parameter
settings in their code. The accuracy of the DNNs is over 94%. Here, we design three safety properties
for all the networks in terms of the safety properties in work [Katz et al. 2017]. They are as follows:
(1) Property 1: for the input constraints 𝜌 ≥ 50000, 𝑣 own ≥ 900 and 𝑣 int ≤ 60, the desired output
should be located in the domain where the output of the action advisory clear-of-conflict
should not be the minimum. Then the unsafe output domain will be 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦2 ∩𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦3 ∩𝑦1 ≤
𝑦4 ∩ 𝑦1 ≤ 𝑦5 .
(2) Property 2: for the input constraints 1500 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1800, −0.06 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 0.06, 𝜓 ≥ 3.10,
𝑣 own ≥ 880 and 𝑣 int ≥ 860. The desired output should that the action advisory clear-ofconflict should not be the minimum.
(3) Property 3: for the input constraints 1500 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1800, −0.06 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 0.06, 𝜓 = 0, 𝑣 own ≥ 900
and 𝑣 int ≥ 700. Their desired output is should that the action advisory clear-of-conflict should
not be the minimum.
As introduced in Section 4, the correction of unsafe data pairs (x, y) is achieved by changing
unsafe y to its closest safe ŷ by adding a vector Δy, which is ŷ = y + Δy. The vector Δy represents
the normal vector with the minimum length, among the normal vectors 𝛼 ⊤ s of the boundary
hyperplanes 𝛼 ⊤ x + 𝛽 = 0 of the unsafe domain. In the safety properties, we have a common
unsafe domain U bounded by 4 linear constraints and their boundary hyperplanes are respectively,
𝑦1 − 𝑦2 = 0, 𝑦1 − 𝑦3 = 0, 𝑦1 − 𝑦4 = 0 and 𝑦1 − 𝑦5 = 0. For a y ∈ U, its Δy is computed over these
hyperplanes.
The safety of neural networks is first verified with our reachability analysis method. They are
determined safe if there is no unsafe input space computed on all three safety properties. Then, for
unsafe networks that violate at least one of the properties, we conduct the repair process with our
framework. The repair process monitors all the properties in case that the model candidate turns
unsafe on new properties. 11 of the 45 networks are verified unsafe. The parameter setting for the
training of the model in the framework is the same as the ones for the training of the original DNNs.
The performance threshold is set to 93%. The experimental results are shown in Table 1. We can see
that all the unsafe networks are successfully repaired by our framework, and that compared to the
original model, the accuracy changes on the repaired safe model are negligible. There is no obvious
performance degradation on the repaired models. This may be because the Δys for the correction
is trivial in these cases, seldom impacting accuracy. We can also notice that the network is repaired
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efficiently in 3 epochs within totally one minute in most of the cases. It is noteworthy that each
repair of the violation on one property does not induce violations on other properties. This is likely
due to the fact that the input regions defined in the safety properties are apart from each other and
repair of unsafe behaviors over one region hardly affects the correct behaviors over other regions.
Table 1. Repair of neural network controllers for HorizontalCAS. There are 11 unsafe neural networks.
accuracy changes represents the accuracy difference (%) between the repaired safe model and the original
unsafe model. epochs of repair represents the number of repair iterations. running time represents the
computational time for the repair.
Neural Networks

𝑁 11

Accuracy Changes(%) +0.55
Epochs of repair
3
Runing Time(sec)
24.3

𝑁 12

𝑁 15

+0.75 +1.3
3
2
23.1 15.2

𝑁 16
+0.39
3
31.5

𝑁 17

𝑁 19

𝑁 26

+1.54 +0.85
14
3
1086.4 59.3

𝑁 41

+2.25 +0.45
11
2
504.2 10.2

𝑁 52

𝑁 55

𝑁 59

-0.31
2
11.1

+0.74
2
20.7

+0.39
2
7.9

Fig. 8. The evolution of the output reachable domain and the unsafe reachable domain in the repair of DNN
𝑁 26 on property 1. The domains are projected on the output 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 which are respectively, the 𝑥 axis and
𝑦 axis. The blue area represents the exact output reachable domain while the red area represents the unsafe
reachable domain which is a subset of the exact output reachable domain.
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Fig. 9. The evolution of the accuracy and the unsafe input domain in the repair of neural networks 𝑁 26 and
𝑁 17 . The right 𝑦 axis represents the accuracy of the model candidate. The accuracy refers to the percentage
of the correct classification of action advisory. The left 𝑦 axis represents the approximated volume ratio of the
unsafe input domain to the whole input domain specified in the safety property.

More details of the repair process of 𝑁 26 and 𝑁 17 is included to illustrate the process. One is the
evolution of the output reachable domain of the candidate model on the violated properties, as
shown in Figure 8. We can notice that the reachable domain in blue expands with the repair while
the unsafe domain in red gradually disappears. The expansion is mainly because the Δy added
to the unsafe y changes the output distribution of the model candidate by turning away y from
the unsafe domain. The other one is the evolution of the accuracy and the unsafe input spaces of
the candidate model, as shown in Figure 9. The unsafe input space computed for each property is
quantified by the percentage of the unsafe volume related to the volume of the whole input domain.
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Table 2. Comparison of our new reachability analysis method with the method [Yang et al. 2021a] on
computational efficiency and memory efficiency. T𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐) and M𝑟 (𝐺𝐵) denote the computational time and
the maximum memory usage of our method for the reachability analysis in one repair. T𝑛𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐) and M𝑛𝑟 (𝐺𝐵)
are for [Yang et al. 2021a] on the same model candidate models.
Nets

𝑁 11

T𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐)
T𝑛𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐)
M𝑟 (𝐺𝐵)
M𝑛𝑟 (𝐺𝐵)

3.3 5.5 4.6 5.2 61.6 9.0
3.5 4.9 5.7 5.1 56.8 9.0
4.90 4.91 4.97 4.92 4.97 4.97
4.94 4.97 5.15 4.99 5.23 5.19

𝑁 12

𝑁 15

𝑁 16

𝑁 17

𝑁 19

𝑁 26

𝑁 41

𝑁 52

𝑁 55

𝑁 59

24.0 3.1
29.3 3.5
4.96 4.94
5.12 4.99

3.1
3.4
4.94
5.00

5.0
4.6
4.97
5.00

3.3
3.4
4.94
5.01

It can be approximated through a large amount of samplings. We can notice that the tendency of
the ratio decreases along with the repair, indicating the unsafe input domain gradually disappears.
While the new accuracy seldom goes below the original accuracy, indicating the repair in this cases
does not degrade the performance.
Table 2 describes the comparison of our new reachability analysis method to the method [Yang
et al. 2021a] regarding computational and memory efficiency. We can notice that there are no
obvious difference between the performance of these methods. This is because the computation of
the reachability analysis is negligible so that the overhead can not be distinguished.
6.2

Rocket Lander Benchmark

The rocket lander benchmark is based on the lunar lander presented in [Brockman et al. 2016].
It is a vertical rocket landing model simulating SpaceX’s Falcon 9 first stage rocket. Unlike the
lunar lander whose action space is discrete, the action space is continuous, which commonly exists
in the practical applications. Besides the rocket, a barge is also included on the sea which moves
horizontally and its dynamics are monitored. The benchmark is shown in Figure 10. The rocket
includes one main engine thruster at the bottom with an actuated joint and also two other side
nitrogen thrusters attached to the sides of the top by un-actuated joints. The main engine has a
power 𝐹𝐸 ranging in [0, 1] and its angle relative to the rocket body is 𝜑. The power 𝐹𝑆 of the side
thrusters ranges in [−1, 1], where −1 indicates that the right thruster has full throttle and the left
thruster is turned off while 1 indicates the opposite. The rocket landing starts in certain height. Its
goal is to land on the center of the barge without falling or crashing by controlling its velocity and
lateral angle 𝜃 through the thrusters.
θ
FR

FL

G

FE

φ

Fig. 10. Rocket lander benchmark.
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There are three actions, the main engine thruster 𝐹𝐸 , its angle 𝜑 and the side nitrogen thrusters
𝐹𝑆 . The original observation contains the position 𝑥 and 𝑦 of the rocket relative to the landing
center on the barge, the velocity 𝑣 𝑥 and 𝑣 𝑦 of the rocket, its lateral angle 𝜃 , its angular velocity
𝜔. To improve the performance of agents, we also incorporate the last action advisory into the
observation for reference. Then, the new observation can denoted as [𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑣 𝑥 , 𝑣 𝑦 , 𝜃, 𝜔, 𝐹𝐸′ , 𝜑 ′, 𝐹𝑆′ ].
Their lower bound 𝑙𝑏 and upper bound 𝑢𝑏 are in Equation 20. The starting state and the reward are
similar to the lunar lander The termination conditions of one episode includes (1) |𝑥 | > 1 which
indicates the rocket moves out of the barge in 𝑥-space, (2) 𝑦 > 1.3 or 𝑦 < 0 which indicates the
rocket moves out of the 𝑦-space or below the barge, (3) 𝜃 > 35◦ which indicates the rocket tilts
greater than the controllable limit.
𝑙𝑏 = [−∞, 0, −∞, −∞, −𝜋, −∞, 0, −15◦, −1]
𝑢𝑏 = [+∞, +∞, +∞, +∞, 𝜋, +∞, 1, 15◦, 1]

(20)

Two safety properties are defined for the agent as below. Since reachability analysis processes
bounded sets, the infinite lower bounds and upper bounds of states above will be replaced with the
searched state space in the learning process of the original agent.
(1) property 1: for the state constraints −20◦ ≤ 𝜃 ≤ −6◦ , 𝜔 < 0, 𝜑 ′ ≤ 0◦ and 𝐹𝑆′ ≤ 0 , the desired
action should be 𝜑 < 0 or 𝐹𝑆 < 0, namely, the unsafe action domain is 𝜑 ≥ 0 ∩ 𝐹𝑆 ≥ 0. It
describes a scenario where the agent should always stop the rocket from tilting to the right.
(2) property 2: for the state constraints 6◦ ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 20◦ , 𝜔 ≥ 0, 𝜑 ′ ≥ 0◦ and 𝐹𝑆′ ≥ 0 , the desired
action should be 𝜑 > 0 or 𝐹𝑆 > 0, namely, the unsafe action domain is 𝜑 ≤ 0 ∩ 𝐹𝑆 ≤ 0. It
describes a scenario where the agent should always stop the rocket from tilting to the left.
The reinforcement learning algorithm Deep Deterministic Policy Gradients (DDPG) [Lillicrap
et al. 2015] is applied on this benchmark, which combines the Q-learning with Policy gradients. This
algorithm is used for the environments with continuous action spaces. It consists of two models:
Actor, a policy network that takes the state as input and outputs exact continuous actions rather
than probability distribution over them, and Critic, a Q-value network that takes state and action
as input and outputs Q-values. The Actor is our target agent controller with its safety properties.
DDPG uses experience replay to update Actor and Critic, where in the training process, a set of
tuples are sampled from previous experiences.
Here, we first learn several agents with the DDPG algorithm. Then, we apply our framework to
repair agents that violate the safety properties. The architecture of the Actor is designed with 9
inputs for state, 5 hidden layers with each containing 20 ReLU neurons, 3 outputs with subsequent
tanh function which maps input spaces into [−1, 1]. Let the three outputs before the tanh be denoted
as 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 and 𝑦3 , the outputs of Actor are computed by 𝐹𝐸 = 0.5 × tanh(𝑦1 )+0.5, 𝜑 = 15◦ × tanh(𝑦2 )
and 𝐹𝑆 = tanh(𝑦3 ). Our reachability analysis is applied to the architecture before the tanh function,
which contains only ReLU neurons. Although the unsafe output domains defined in safety properties
above are for outputs 𝜑 and 𝐹𝑆 after the tanh function, the domains 𝜑 ≥ 0 ∩ 𝐹𝑆 ≥ 0, 𝜑 ≤ 0 ∩ 𝐹𝑆 ≤ 0
are actually equivalent to 𝑦2 ≥ 0∩𝑦3 ≥ 0, 𝑦2 ≤ 0∩𝑦3 ≤ 0. The architecture of the Critic is designed
with 12 inputs for state and action, 5 hidden layers with each containing 20 ReLU neurons, 1 output
for the Q-value. The capacity of the global buffer to store previous experience is set to 4 × 105 .
The learning rate for Actor and Critic is set to 10−4 and 10−3 respectively. The 1000 episodes are
performed for each learning. Overall, three unsafe agents are obtained.
For the repair process, the parameters are as follows. the learning rates for Actor and Critic
stay unchanged. A buffer stores all old experiences from the learning process. In addition, another
global buffer is included to store new experiences with unsafe states as initial states. From these
two buffers, old experiences as well as new experiences are randomly selected to form a set of
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training tuples in Figure 4(b). As introduced, a new penalty reward is added for any wrong actions
generated from input states. Its value is normally set to the lowest reward in the old experience.
Here, the penalty is set to -30. To maintain the performance, the threshold of the change ratio
which is defined in Equation 21 is set to -0.2.
Performance (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 ) − Performance (𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 )
Ratio =
(21)
Performance (𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 )
For each unsafe agent, we conduct the repair 5 times with each repair aiming to obtain a safe
agent. There are 15 instances used for evaluation. The experimental results are shown in Table 3
and 4. The evolution of the unsafe input domain like Figure 9 is not included for this benchmark
because the sampling does not work well for high dimensional input space. Table 3 describes the
performance change ratio, the epochs of repair and the total time, where the performance of agents
is evaluated by the averaged reward on 1000 episodes of running. We note that our framework can
successfully repair the 3 agents in all 15 instances. In most cases, the performance of the repaired
agent is slightly improved. The performance degradation in other instances is also trivial. The
repair process takes 2-6 epochs for all instances with the running time ranging from 332.7 seconds
to 2632.9 seconds. Also, during the repair process, we notice that repairing unsafe behaviors on one
property occasionally leads to new unsafe behaviors on the other property. This is likely because
the input regions defined in the properties are adjacent to each other but their desired output
regions are different, and the repaired behaviors over one input region can easily expand to other
regions over which different behaviors are expected.
Next, we conduct a comparison of our new reachability analysis method with the method
presented in [Yang et al. 2021a]. The results are shown in Table 4. In terms of computational
efficiency and memory efficiency, our method outperforms this method in [Yang et al. 2021a]. The
computational efficiency improvement of our method ranges between a maximum of 6.8 times
faster and a minimum of 3.6 times faster, with an average of 4.7. The reduction on memory usage
ranges between 61.7% and 70.2%, with an average of f 64.5%. It is noteworthy that there are many
factors that affect computational complexity of the reachability analysis, such as the number of
neurons, the input domain as well as the parameter weights of DNNs. Therefore, for the three
agents with the same architecture but different weights, the computational time is different.
Table 3. Repair of unsafe agents for the rocket lander. ID is the index of each repair. Ratio denotes the
performance change ratio of the repaired agent compared to the original unsafe agent as formulated in
Equation 21. Epoch denotes the number of epochs for repair. Time (sec) denotes the running time for one
repair with our reachability analysis method.

ID

Ratio

1
2
3
4
5

+0.063
+0.088
+0.079
+0.078
+0.085

Agent 1
Epoch Time
3
3
3
3
3

332.7
302.0
447.9
884.2
754.3

Ratio
+0.048
+0.012
-0.084
+0.025
-0.001

Agent 2
Epoch Time
3
6
4
3
4

635.7
1308.4
812.9
620.3
813.5

Ratio
+0.053
+0.085
-0.033
+0.073
-0.165

Agent 3
Epoch Time
2
3
3
2
5

446.1
1451.6
2417.1
1395.3
2632.9

In addition, we analyze the evolution of the reachable domain of candidate models in the repair.
An example of Agent 1 on the first repair is shown in Figure 11. At 𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑐ℎ = 0 which is before the
repair, we can notice that the candidate agent has unsafe output reachable domain on Property
1 and is safe on Property 2. At 𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑐ℎ = 1, the unsafe reachable domain becomes smaller, which
indicates that the agent learned from the penalty assigned to the unsafe actions and its action space
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Table 4. Comparison of our new reachability analysis method with the method [Yang et al. 2021a] on
computational efficiency and memory efficiency. T𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐) and M𝑟 (𝐺𝐵) denote the computational time and
the maximum memory usage of our method for all reachability analysis of all candidate models in one repair.
T𝑛𝑟 (𝑠𝑒𝑐) and M𝑛𝑟 (𝐺𝐵) are for [Yang et al. 2021a] on the same model candidate models.

ID

T𝑟

1
2
3
4
5

129.4
122.9
206.7
329.0
224.53

Agent 1
T𝑛𝑟
M𝑟
760.0
740.4
1361.9
2250.6
1454.2

15.94
15.48
16.74
15.66
15.32

M𝑛𝑟

T𝑟

42.69
40.45
45.41
43.89
40.77

426.1
935.9
572.6
428.4
579.5

Agent 2
T𝑛𝑟
M𝑟
1583.6
3352.8
2106.7
1569.7
2108.3

13.38
13.58
13.55
13.67
13.68

M𝑛𝑟

T𝑟

36.39
37.23
36.55
35.97
35.99

700.5
618.6
645.3
714.4
997.0

Agent 3
T𝑛𝑟
M𝑟
2513.7
2586.6
3054.0
3019.8
3277.3

14.48
14.33
15.13
15.49
15.99

M𝑛𝑟
46.05
48.18
44.91
47.10
48.86

moves towards the safe domain. After another repair, the agent becomes safe on both properties. We
can also notice that during the repair the output reachable domains do not change much, indicating
that the performance of the agent is preserved.

Fig. 11. The evolution of the output reachable domain and the unsafe reachable domain in the repair of Agent
1 on the first repair. 𝑥 axis represents 𝑦2 and 𝑦 axis represents 𝑦3 . The blue area represents the exact output
reachable domain while the red area represents the unsafe reachable domain which is a subset of the exact
output reachable domain. The bottom left area is the reachable domain on Property 1 and the top right area
is the reachable domain on Property 2.

7

RELATED WORKS

Adversarial and robust training. The adversarial training [Goodfellow et al. 2014; Madry et al.
2017; Mirman et al. 2018; Wong and Kolter 2018; Zhang et al. 2019] is a type of method where
adversarial examples are obtained by adversarial attacks or reachability analysis based on the over
approximation. These methods have been shown effective in improving the robustness of DNN
against adversarial attacks. It inspires us to combine the adversarial training with the more accurate
reachability analysis methods that provide complete details of misbehaviors, such that provably
safe DNNs can be learned. The difference between our framework and the adversarial training is
that instead of examples from random attacks, our framework can identify examples representative
of the entire unsafe domain computed from the reachability analysis.
Verification of Deep Neural Networks. Many methods for safety verification of DNNs have
been developed, which are mainly based on reachability [Gehr et al. 2018; Tran et al. 2019b;
Xiang et al. 2017, 2018; Yang et al. 2020], optimization [Bastani et al. 2016; Dvijotham et al. 2018;
Lomuscio and Maganti 2017; Raghunathan et al. 2018; Tjeng et al. 2019; Wong and Kolter 2018],
and search [Bunel et al. 2018; Dutta et al. 2018; Ehlers 2017; Huang et al. 2017; Katz et al. 2017;
Wang et al. 2018; Weng et al. 2018]. The reachability analysis method is a very appealing method
for the repair because it can provide regions of DNN misbehaviors. The spectrum of reachability
methods can be broadly categorized in two classes: over-approximation and exact analysis methods.
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Over-approximation methods are able to provide safety guarantees but are also incomplete, i.e.,
the method may return unsafe due to over-approximation when in fact the system is safe. These
methods ensure quick safety verification but are not sufficient for the repair. The repair also requires
the exact analysis method which can compute the exact unsafe input domain and output domain of
DNNs. Thus, we design an algorithm to integrate these two type of method by taking advantage of
their merits, which has been shown around 5 times faster than the related work.
The efficiency and accuracy of reachability analysis is strongly associated with the set representation. Approaches, particularly for the DNN’s, Zonotope [Gehr et al. 2018], Star-set [Bak et al. 2020;
Tran et al. 2020a, 2019a,c, 2021, 2020b] and facet-vertex incidence matrix (FVIM) with vertices [Yang
et al. 2021a] are utilized. Each set representation has its advantages and challenges. For instance,
a zonotope can be represented with finite vectors v𝑖 by summing 𝑎𝑖 v𝑖 , where 𝑎𝑖 is scalar ranging
between 0 and 1. Such a simple representation enables the development of fast over-approximation
methods for reachability analysis. The star-set representation is essentially an enhancement of
the half-space representation, which can efficiently process affine mapping in DNNs. The FVIM is
used for exact reachability analysis for repair in this work. For the integration of methods, the new
set representation V-zono which can be compatible with FVIM and efficiently encodes vertices is
designed for the over approximation method with ReLU linear relaxation.
Deep Neural Networks Repair. Works [Goldberger et al. 2020; Sohn et al. 2019a] attempt to
correct unsafe behavior of DNNs by modifying neural weights that is likely associated with the
misbehaviors. Due to the black-box nature of DNNs, the modification of such weights may result in
unpredicted performance degradation of DNNs. Work [Sotoudeh and Thakur 2021a] introduces a
Decoupled DNN architecture. Based on this architecture, their provable polytope repair which aims
to correct misbehaviors of ReLU DNNs over a domain can be reduced to a LP problem. However,
this method is only applicable to the two-dimensional input region for the DNNs having similar
size to the ones in the HorizontalCAS benchmark – a five-dimensional input.
8

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented a reachability-based framework to repair unsafe DNN controllers for autonomous
systems. The approach can be utilized to repair unsafe DNNs with only training data available. It
can also be integrated into existing reinforcement algorithms to synthesize safe DNN controllers.
Our experimental results on two practical benchmarks have shown that the proposed framework
can successfully obtain a provably safe DNN while maintaining its accuracy and performance.
We utilize a new set representation and integrate an over approximation method to improve the
performance and memory footprint of our rechability analysis algorithm.
Nonetheless, safe training or repairing of DNNs with reachability analysis is still a challenging
problem. There are several aspects we plan to study in the future. Firstly, computation of the
unsafe set domain of larger-scale DNNs with higher dimensional inputs, such as DNNs for image
classification, is still challenging. Therefore, new approaches are needed to repair such unsafe DNNs.
Secondly, training of DNNs relies on appropriate meta parameters and cannot always guarantee
the convergence to optimal performance, which can impose difficulties for the repair process
to converge. Thus, analysis of the interaction between DNN training and its repair is necessary.
Furthermore, from our observations it becomes more difficult to repair unsafe DNNs when the
input spaces of two safety properties are adjacent but with different desired output behaviors. This
is due to the fact that it may be difficult for the DNN to learn a boundary to distinguish these
adjacent input spaces and behave correctly. Therefore, a thorough study on understanding the
convergence of the proposed framework is critical for enhancing its applicability to real-world
applications.
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